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Abstract
This article derives antitrust implications for markets where entry can be regarded
as endogenous (contrary to most analysis within the post-Chicago tradition). Many
applications concern issues of abuse of dominance. Endogenous entry requires a wide
revision of our understanding of the role of incumbents in pricing, producing in the
presence of network externalities and multi-sided markets, bundling products, price
discriminating and delegating to retailers through vertical restraints: when entry is
endogenous, leaders adopt aggressive strategies without exclusionary purposes and
without aﬀecting welfare negatively. Endogenous entry has also implications for the
analysis of mergers (that take place only if create enough cost eﬃciencies and do not
harm consumers), the evaluation of collusive cartels (that are unfeasible in markets
where entry is endogenous) and state aids for exporting ﬁrms (which are always uni-
laterally optimal for international markets with free entry). The spirit of the policy
recommendations of the Chicago school is broadly supported by our analysis in a solid
game-theoretic framework.
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1In this article I will propose a critical view of the post-Chicago approach to
antitrust policy, emphasizing that this approach has often disregarded the con-
sequences of the endogeneity of the market structure. Taking into account the
endogeneity of entry in a market, standard results of the post-Chicago literature
can be radically modiﬁed. The main implications concern the behavior of mar-
ket leaders and, consequently, the antitrust approach to abuse of dominance (or
monopolization), but I will also derive implications for the antitrust approach
to mergers, collusion and state aids. The overall ﬂavour of the endogenous entry
approach is reminiscent of the Chicago school, but my analysis is based on solid
game theoretic foundations in line with the post-Chicago tradition.
The theory of endogenous entry and market leadership has shown that
whether entry in a market is exogenous or endogenous makes a lot of diﬀer-
ence for the way leaders behave (Etro, 2006a, 2008,a). In markets where entry
is independent from the proﬁtability conditions, market leaders can adopt ac-
commodating strategies to increase prices or aggressive ones to exclude rivals,
and their strategies can harm consumers. When entry is endogenously depen-
dent on the proﬁtability conditions in the market, the leaders always adopt
aggressive strategies which typically do not harm consumers. For instance, a
ﬁrm competing with a single rival could engage in accommodating pricing to
increase mark ups, or could engage in predatory pricing to induce the exit of the
rival, but a ﬁrm facing endogenous entry of competitors will ordinarily engage in
aggressive pricing strategies without exclusionary purposes. A monopolist in a
primary market competing with a single rival on a secondary market may bundle
its goods to monopolize the secondary market as well, but when the secondary
market is characterized by endogenous entry the only purpose of bundling can
be the strengthening of price competition. A ﬁrm facing a single rival could
adopt vertical restraints on its retailers or price discrimination strategies to
soften price competition, but when the same ﬁrm faces endogenous entry of
rivals these anti-competitive practices will not be in its interest. Of course, no-
tice that eﬃciency reasons can still motivate the adoption of bundling, vertical
restraints, price discrimination or other strategies.
The theory of endogenous entry delivers a related and strong result on hor-
izontal mergers. As well known, even in the absence of cost eﬃciencies, these
mergers are often proﬁtable when entry is exogenous because they allow the
merged entity to increase prices or restrict production so as to enhance prof-
itability. These eﬀects are counterproductive when entry is endogenous be-
cause any accommodating strategy attracts entry. Therefore, the only rationale
for mergers in markets with endogenous entry must be a cost eﬃciency large
enough to (more than) compensate the strategic disadvantages associated with
the merger. In these cases, mergers are welfare improving. Simila results ap-
ply to cartels, that are ineﬀective whenever entry in the market is endogenous,
unless the cartels act as a leaders. In this last case, the cartels coordinate
aggressive strategies aimed at increasing the market shares of their members
through low prices, and their implementation is always sustainable and it does
2not harm consumers.
It is clear that the relevance of these results depends on the relevance of
the hypothesis that entry is endogenous. One may argue that entry can be
regarded as endogenous in the medium and long run, but not in the short run.
If this is the case, and if antitrust policy is aimed at correcting distortions in the
medium and long run (as opposed to short run distortions), then these results
are potentially relevant.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 1 I will review
the traditional approaches to antitrust and in Section 2 I will describe the en-
dogenous entry approach. Section 3 summarizes the basic theoretical results.
Section 4 applies the theory to abuse of dominance issues, including predatory
pricing, bundling, price discrimination and vertical restraints. Section 5 is about
mergers in markets with endogenous entry. Section 6 focuses on cartels. Section
7 explores aspects of the state aids policy. Section 8 concludes.
1 Chicago and post-Chicago views
The so-called pre-Chicago approach was mostly based on the simplistic insights
of the early studies on imperfect competition, which associated monopolistic be-
havior and abusive conduct with ﬁrms having large market shares. Such a na¨ ıve
view has been challenged since the 50s- 60s by what we now call the “Chicago
school”, led by Aaron Director and other exponents of the Law School of the
University of Chicago, whose main merit has been to introduce a systematic
economic approach to antitrust. While the Chicago school was seriously attack-
ing collusive agreements as conducive to large welfare losses, it was less critical
of mergers and exclusionary practices. Many scholars were (and still are) con-
vinced that, when there are potential entrants in a given sector, mergers are
mostly aimed at creating beneﬁcial cost eﬃciencies, while aggressive strategies
as bundling, price discrimination and exclusive dealing, are not necessarily anti-
competitive but may instead have a strong eﬃciency rationale behind them.
For instance, bundling is typically used for price discrimination purposes and
not for exclusionary purposes. Moreover, according to a widespread view in the
Chicago school, there is no such a thing as predatory pricing, that is reduc-
ing prices below costs to induce exit by the competitors so as to compensate
the initial losses with future monopolistic proﬁts. The main reason is that, if
the predator can sustain such initial losses, also any other pray can sustain the
induced losses (which are smaller since its output is lower) as long as credit mar-
kets are properly working, therefore predatory pricing would not be eﬀective to
start with.1
More recently, Posner (2001) has taken a less extreme position, claiming
that “there is an economic basis for concern with at least some exclusionary
1See McGee (1958).
3practices, in at least some circumstances; and a few practices that are not ex-
clusionary (though so classiﬁed in the law), like persistent price discrimination,
may still be undesirable on strictly economic grounds” (Posner, 2001, p. 4). Ac-
cordingly, Posner proposes a moderate standard for judging practices claimed
to be exclusionary: “in every case in which such a practice is alleged, the plain-
tiﬀ must prove ﬁrst that the defendant has monopoly power and second that
the challenged practice is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the de-
fendant’s market an equally or more eﬃcient competitor. The defendant can
rebut by proving that although it is a monopolist and the challenged practice
exclusionary, the practice is, on balance, eﬃcient” (ibidem, pp. 194-5). This
eﬃciency defense is at the basis of the rule of reason approach, for which a
business practice is not per se illegal, but can be justiﬁed if it does not harm
consumers or creates eﬃciencies.
In the modern economic debate, the Chicago school has been criticized for
failing to provide results that were robust enough to withstand full-ﬂedged
game-theoretic analysis of dynamic competition between incumbents and en-
trants. The so-called “post-Chicago” approach, has shown that in the presence
of strategic asymmetries between incumbents and entrants and pervasive mar-
ket imperfections, strategies as price-cuts, bundling or vertical restraints can be
anti-competitive because they can successfully deter entry in the short run and
protect monopolistic rents in the long run. I believe that the Chicago school
provided fundamental insights into many antitrust issues, but it failed to pro-
vide a complete understanding of the behavior of market leaders. In particular,
it limited most of its analysis to the understanding of how monopolistic and
p e r f e c t l yc o m p e t i t i v em a r k e t sw o r k ,a n di naf e wc a s e si tf o c u s e do nm a r k e t s
characterized by a monopolist facing a competitive fringe of potential entrants.2
Dismissing the useful progress in the applications of game theory, the Chicago
school ignored the important role of the strategic interactions between incum-
bents and entrants. The consequence was that its approach to exclusionary
practices has been often biased toward a competitive role of the incumbents
without an updated theoretical support.
In the 80s, while the Chicago school was succeeding in reducing the enforce-
ment attitudes of US antitrust law, especially under the Reagan Administration,
the post-Chicago approach started to expand its inﬂuence between economists
and, in the following decade, also between antitrust scholars. This approach
introduced new game theoretic tools to study complex market structures and
derive sound normative implications, which represents one of the main contri-
butions of this line of research. With reference to exclusionary practices, the
post-Chicago approach has shown that in the presence of strategic commitments
to undertake preliminary investments, of asymmetric information between ﬁrms,
of credit market imperfections or in the presence of limited forms of irrationality,
2Somewhat related with this literature is the theory of contestable markets by Baumol et
al. (1982).
4predatory pricing can be an equilibrium strategy for the incumbent, can deter
entry and it can harm consumers. Similarly, it has shown that bundling can
be used to strengthen price competition and exclude a rival from a secondary
market. Analogously, many other strategies can have an exclusionary purpose.
One should keep in mind that many of the results of the post-Chicago ap-
proach (summarized in the early but still unsurpassed work of Tirole, 1988) are
quite weak, and they largely depend on a number of restrictive assumptions. For
example, predatory pricing has been shown to be exclusionary under extreme
circumstances, including forms of irrational behavior (in reputation models) or
pervasive market imperfections, and, even when exclusion emerges under more
plausible conditions, it is not necessarily associated with a pricing below cost
or even with reductions in consumer welfare (in signalling models), which is
what should matter in drawing antitrust implications. Nevertheless, the intel-
lectual achievements of the post-Chicago approach, especially the introduction
of game theory as the ultimate tool of industrial organization and the proof of
the possibility of proﬁtable exclusionary strategies, are remarkable.
My critique of the post-Chicago approach is not centered on its game the-
oretic foundation or on its speciﬁc results, but on the general applicability of
these results for policy purposes. In most cases, the modern game theoretic
literature in industrial organization has studied the behavior of incumbent mo-
nopolists facing a single potential entrant. To cite the most known theoretical
works with strong relevance for antitrus ti s s u e s ,t h i sw a st h ec a s eo ft h eD i x i t
(1980) model of entry deterrence, of the models by Kreps and Wilson (1982)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) of predatory pricing, by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) and by Bulow et al. (1985) on strategic investment, by Rey and Stiglitz
(1988) and Bonanno and Vickers (1988) on vertical restraints, by Whinston
(1990) on bundling for entry deterrence purposes, and many other subsequent
works based on analysis of duopolies with an incumbent and an entrant.3 Also
most of the standard results on the behavior of incumbents in terms of pricing,
R&D investments, mergers, quality choices and vertical and horizontal diﬀeren-
tiation are derived in duopolistic models, where the incumbent chooses its own
strategies in competition with a single entrant. While this analysis simpliﬁes the
interaction between incumbents and competitors, it can be highly misleading,
since it assumes away the possibility of endogenous entry, and hence limits its
relevance to situations where the incumbent already has an exogenous amount
of market power.
It is not surprising that the results of the post-Chicago approach are of-
ten biased toward an anti-competitive role of the incumbents: these engage
in predatory pricing, threaten or undertake overinvestments in complementary
markets and patent new technologies only to preempt entry, impose exclusive
dealing contracts, or bundle their goods with the sole purpose of deterring the
entry of the competitor. Otherwise they are accommodating, engaging in exces-
3See Motta (2004) and Whinston (2006) on the post-Chicago approach.
5sive pricing or in anticompetitive mergers aimed at increasing prices, or stiﬂing
innovation to preserve their power. In such a simple scenario, what antitrust au-
thorities should do is unambiguously ﬁght against incumbents: punish their ag-
gressive pricing strategies as predatory, and their accommodating pricing strate-
gies as exploitative, punish investments in complementary markets as attempts
to monopolize them, weaken their intellectual property rights, forbid bundling
strategies, prohibit mergers and so on. The bottom line is that, according to
this view, antitrust authorities should sanction virtually any behavior of the
incumbents which does not conform to that of their competitors.
The fallacy of this line of thought, in my view, derives from a simple fact:
it is based on a partial theory of oligopoly limited to the analysis of duopolies
with an incumbent and an entrant which does not take into account that, at
least in most cases, entry by competitors is not an exogenous fact, but an
endogenous choice. Whether entry is more or less costly, it is typically the fruit
of an endogenous decision by the potential competitors. Of course, entry can
be regarded as an exogenous phenomenon in the case of a natural monopoly or
when there are legal barriers to entry, but these cases should not be a subject
of antitrust analysis, but of regulatory analysis. When entry can be regarded
as an endogenous element which depends on the technological conditions that
constraint the proﬁtability of the ﬁrms, we need a complete understanding of
the behavior of leaders facing endogenous entry.
2 The role of endogenous entry
The endogenous entry approach clariﬁe st h er o l eo fm a r k e tl e a d e r sa n do ft h e
entry conditions in a game-theoretic framework that is more general than most
analysis within the post-Chicago approach. In this section I will review its
results and compare its implications for antitrust with those of the traditional
approaches, but before doing that, I need to clarify a few concepts concerning
the determinants of entry in a market.
The industrial organization literature has emphasized diﬀerent kinds of con-
straints on entry. The deﬁnition of barriers to entry has been quite debated
in the literature. Bain (1956) associated them with the situation in which es-
tablished ﬁrms can elevate their selling prices above minimal average costs of
production without inducing entry in the long run. Broadly speaking, such a
situation corresponds to what we deﬁned as competition between an exogenous
number of ﬁrms: even if proﬁts can be obtained in the market, entry is not
possible. Stigler (1968) has proposed a diﬀerent deﬁnition of barriers to entry,
associating them with costs of production which must be borne by ﬁrms seek-
ing to enter an industry but not borne by the incumbents; a similar approach
has been prevailing more recently (Baumol et al., 1982), so that we can talk
of barriers to entry as sunk costs of entry for the competitors which are above
the corresponding costs of the incumbent (or have been already paid by the in-
6cumbent). According to this deﬁnition, sunk costs can be binding on the entry
decision of the followers, therefore, they can be a crucial determinant of the
endogeneity of entry in a market. A ﬁnal category is that of the ﬁxed costs of
entry: these are equally faced by the incumbent and the followers to produce in
the market, but they can also represent a binding constraint on entry. While
there is a fundamental diﬀerence in the concepts of sunk costs and ﬁxed costs
of entry, their role in endogenizing entry is virtually the same, and we will not
stress the diﬀerence in what follows.4
The main point emerging from our analysis of the behavior of market leaders
facing or not facing endogenous entry is that standard measures of the concen-
tration of a market have no relation with the market power of the leaders of a
market, and may lead to misleading welfare comparisons.5 In what follows, I
will review the main applications for models of competition in quantities and in
prices, and to models with strategic commitments. The reader interested in the
theoretical results can skip to the next section.
2.1 Competition in quantities
T h ei r r e l e v a n c eo fm a r k e ts h a r e sf o rt h ee v a l u a t i o no ft h em a r k e tp o w e ro fl e a d -
ers emerges quite clearly in the simplest environment, that of competition in
quantities with homogenous goods, constant marginal costs and a ﬁxed cost
of production. Such a simple structure approximates the situation of many
sectors where product diﬀerentiation is not very important but there are high
costs to starting production (as in many high-tech sectors). In such markets the
characterization of the equilibrium structure is drastically diﬀerent when entry
conditions change. First of all, as long as the number of ﬁr m si se x o g e n o u s l y
given and the ﬁxed costs of production are not too high, the leader is aggressive
but leaves space for the followers to be active in the market. As external ob-
servers, we would look at this as a market characterized by an incumbent with
a market share typically larger than its rivals, but with a certain number of
competitors whose supply of goods reduces the equilibrium market price. The
higher the number of these competitors, the lower the price will be: in such a
case, lower concentration would be correctly associated with higher welfare.
Radical changes occur when entry in the market is endogenous, and is de-
4Another important aspect is about the source of these barriers and costs. As we noticed
before, they can constitute a source of antitrust examination if they have been artiﬁcially
created or enlarged by the incumbent; they cannot if their source is purely technological.
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine how artiﬁcial barriers could be erected under normal
circumstances. The Chicago school is quite clear on this point, as we can conclude from the
following position of Bork (1993): “If everything that makes entry more diﬃcult is viewed as
a barrier, and if barriers are bad, then eﬃciency is evil. That conclusion is inconsistent with
consumer-oriented policy. What must be proved to exist, therefore, is a class of barriers that
do not reﬂect superior eﬃciency and can be erected by ﬁrms to inhibit rivals. I think it clear
that no such class of artiﬁcial barriers exists.”
5See also Etro (2006,c; 2007b,c).
7termined by the existence of proﬁt a b l eo p p o r t u n i t i e si nt h es a m em a r k e t . I n
such a case the leader would expand production until no one of the potential
entrants has incentives to supply its goods in the market. The intuition for this
extremely aggressive behavior of the market leader is simple. When entry is
endogenous, the leader understands that a low production creates a large space
for entry in the market while a high production reduces entry opportunities.
More precisely, knowing how technological constraints govern the incentives to
enter in the industry, the leader is aware that its output exactly crowds out the
output of the competitors leaving unchanged the aggregate supply and hence
the equilibrium price. However, taking this equilibrium price for the market as
given, the leader can increase its proﬁts by increasing its output and reducing
the average costs of production. Here the ﬁxed costs of production (associated
with constant marginal costs) are crucial: on one side they constrain the prof-
itability of entry, while on the other side they create scale economies in the
production process that can be exploited by the leader through an expansion of
its output. Actually, it is always optimal for the leader to produce enough to
crowd out all output by the competitors: exploiting the economies of scale over
t h ee n t i r em a r k e ta l l o w st h el e a d e rt oe n j o yp o s i t i v ep r o ﬁts even if no entrant
could obtain positive proﬁts in this market. As external observers, in this case,
we would simply see a single ﬁrm obtaining positive proﬁts in a market where
no one else enters, and, following traditional paradigms, we would associate this
situation with a monopolistic environment, or at least with a dominant position
derived by some barriers to entry. But this association is not correct, since en-
t r yi si n d e e df r e ei nt h i sm a r k e t :i ti st h e competitive pressure of the potential
entrants that induces the leader to produce so much to drive down the equilib-
rium price until no other ﬁrm can enter. And we are talking of ﬁrms that are
as eﬃcient as the leader (we assumed identical cost technologies). Finally, in
Etro (2008,a) I noticed that this equilibrium with only the leader in the market
is associated with a higher welfare than the free entry equilibrium without a
leadership - the Marshall equilibrium, which would involve many ﬁrms active in
the market and earning zero proﬁts.
Let us consider now a related situation with a diﬀerent cost pattern for the
ﬁrms. When marginal costs are substantially increasing in the production level
or, more generally, when the average costs have a U-shape, a market leader
facing endogenous entry of competitors may not have incentives to deter entry,
but would still behave in an aggressive way. In such a case, given the strategy of
the leader, all the entrants maximize their own proﬁts and therefore they price
above the marginal cost. However, endogenous entry reduces the equilibrium
p r i c ea tal e v e lt h a ti sj u s th i g he n o u g ht oc o v e rt h eﬁxed costs of production.
Notice that this equilibrium generates a production below the eﬃcient scale
(which should equate marginal and average costs). Also in this case, the leader
takes into account these elements and, in particular, takes as given the equilib-
rium price emerging from the endogenous entry of the competitors. Accordingly,
the leader ﬁnds it optimal to produce as much to equate its marginal cost to
8the price, which requires a production above the eﬃcient scale. Since marginal
costs are increasing for such a high production level, the leader is pricing above
its average cost, and hence obtains positive proﬁts. In this case the strategy
of the leader does not even aﬀect the market price, which is fully determined
by endogenous entry of ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the leader obtains a larger market
share than its rivals and positive proﬁts. Moreover, in Etro (2008,a) I have
shown that the aggressive behavior of the leader, that adopts a price equal to
the marginal cost, improves the allocation of resources compared to the same
market with free entry and no leadership. A similar situation emerges when
goods are not homogeneous but they diﬀer in quality.
The crucial lesson from this analysis is that we should be careful in drawing
any conclusion from indexes of concentration or from the market shares. Of
course, an abusive behavior can be still associated with aggressive strategies
aimed at foreclosure and with negative consequences on consumers. This can
be the case under two circumstances: 1) when these strategies are implemented
by leaders with genuine market power which is not constrained by eﬀective
entry, and 2) when the same leader has built barriers to artiﬁcially constrain
entry and without eﬃciency reasons. Finally, notice that a complete analysis of
the consequences of entry deterrence would require a dynamic model taking into
account the behavior of the leader before and after deterrence, which is beyond
the scope of this paper, but simple models are often able to say a lot. Our point
here is simply to warn against the risk of directly associating aggressive price
strategies that reduce entry with strategies that harm consumers.
2.2 Competition in prices
Another important implication of the theory of market leaders emerges quite
clearly under competition in prices. In this typical situation, the traditional
analysis of Stackelberg oligopolies shows that dominant ﬁrms are either accom-
modating (setting high prices) or trying to exclude rivals by setting low enough
prices: the ﬁrst case happens when the ﬁxed costs of entry are small (and pre-
dation would be too costly), the second when they are high enough.6 Such an
outcome implies the risk of erroneously associating an aggressive price strategy
with an entry deterring strategy in a systematic fashion. When we endogenize
entry in the market, leaders never adopt accommodating pricing strategies while
they are always aggressive. Again, in equilibrium with endogenous entry, leaders
increase their market shares and obtain positive proﬁts. Of course an aggres-
sive pricing strategy will still reduce entry, even if it will not exclude all rivals.
Nevertheless, we must be more careful in associating aggressive pricing with
predatory purposes. The reason why predatory strategies are anti-competitive
6Accommodating high prices are chosen by the leader when ﬁxed costs of entry are small.
The problem is that this is exactly when there are incentives for other ﬁrms to enter, hence
the duopolistic equilibrium is quite weak, and the study of endogenous entry becomes crucial.
9is that they exclude competition in the future allowing the dominant ﬁrm to be-
have in a monopolistic fashion once competitors are out of the market. Clearly,
if an aggressive pricing strategy is aimed at excluding some but not all competi-
tors, this anti-competitive element is more limited.
Notice that competition in prices is quite typical of markets where product
diﬀerentiation is relevant and ﬁrms have more autonomy in choosing their prices
directly. The results are also relevant in oligopolistic markets in which prices
determine the volume of business, as in the banking sector, where the interest
r a t e so nl o a n sd e t e r m i n eh o wm u c hﬁrms borrow from a bank, and the interest
rates on deposits determine how much households lend to a bank.
2.3 Strategic commitments
In general, the spirit of our result on the aggressive behavior of leaders goes
through when leaders cannot commit to output or price strategies, but can un-
dertake preliminary investments that change their incentives in the market. For
instance, a market leader facing an exogenous number of competitors may want
to underinvest or overinvest strategically in cost reducing R&D according to the
kind of competition (in prices or in quantities), because it may want to commit
through these investments to adopt an accommodating or an aggressive strategy
in the market: in particular, underinvesting is optimal before price competition,
while overinvesting is optimal before quantity competition. However, this ambi-
guity collapses if the leader is facing endogenous entry of competitors. In such a
case, it is always optimal to adopt the strategy that allows one to be aggressive
in the market: strategic overinvestment in cost reducing R&D is optimal inde-
pendently from the form of competition, because it allows one to be aggressive
against competitors.7 A similar role is attached to investment in production
capacity, to debt as a ﬁnancing tool issued to commit management to produce
higher output, and to many other strategic investments.
An interesting situation for antitrust purposes emerges when demand is char-
acterized by network eﬀects. In such a case, market leaders tend to underprice
their products initially to attract customers in the future. As known, these
strategies may induce pricing below marginal cost without entry deterrence
purposes. Moreover, leaders facing endogenous entry may have further strate-
gic incentives to reduce initial prices (or expand initial production): by doing
so, they enhance network externalities and are able to reduce their prices also
in the future. Therefore, antitrust authorities should be careful in evaluating
aggressive pricing in the presence of network eﬀects. Finally, this point applies
7Both eﬀe c t i v ea n dp o t e n t i a lc o m p e t i t i o na r ec r u c i a lh e r e .O nt h i sp o i n t ,w ea r ec l o s et o
early informal insights of the Chicago school. For instance, Posner (2001, p. 145) notices that
“notions of potential competition cannot and should not be banished entirely from antitrust
law... a monopolist who creates excess capacity in order to reduce his marginal cost, so that
entrants (who have to be able to cover their average total cost if they are to make a go of
entry) are deterred, is reacting to potential competition.”
10in particular to multi-sided markets, where network eﬀects take place between
diﬀerent kinds of customers, and ﬁrms can charge diﬀerently their diﬀerent cus-
tomers. In such an environment market leaders tend to price quite aggressively
one of the sides, but again without exclusionary purposes.
The same care in judging aggressive strategies is needed in cases of comple-
mentary strategies that virtually induce aggressive behavior. One of these is
bundling. In an inﬂuential paper, Whinston (1990) has studied bundling in a
market with two goods. The primary good is monopolized by one ﬁrm, which
competes with a single rival in the market for the secondary good. Under price
competition in the secondary market, the monopolist becomes more aggressive
in its price choice in case of bundling of its two goods. Since a more aggressive
strategy leads to lower prices for both ﬁrms as long as both are producing, the
only reason why the monopolist may want to bundle its two goods is to deter
entry of the rival in the secondary market. This conclusion can be highly mis-
leading because it neglects the possibility of further entry in the market. If the
secondary market is characterized by endogenous entry, the monopolist would
always like to be aggressive in this market and bundling may be the right way
to commit to an aggressive strategy. Bundling would not necessarily deter en-
try in this case, especially if there is a high degree of product diﬀerentiation in
the secondary market, but may increase competition in this market and reduce
prices with positive eﬀects on the consumers.
Another application of the theory of market leaders concerns vertical re-
straints aﬀecting inter-brand competition (Bonanno and Vickers, 1988; Rey
and Stiglitz, 1988). Also in this case, the behavior of the market leader can be
anticompetitive depending on the entry conditions. In particular, under price
competition, a contract delegating distribution to a downstream ﬁrm tends to
soften price competition when entry in the market is exogenous (because the
upstream ﬁrm imposes high prices through direct or indirect contractual re-
straints), but it strengthens price competition when entry is endogenous (in
which case the upstream ﬁrm can only gain by inducing an aggressive behavior
of the downstream ﬁrm): the consequences on consumers tend to be negative
in the former case and positive in the latter case.
We will encounter a more complex situation when considering price discrim-
ination versus uniform pricing, since they can both soften or strengthen price
competition in diﬀerent markets. However, we will show an example in which,
when price discrimination emerges between two groups of customers, it is also
likely to soften price competition compared to uniform pricing. If this is the
case, price discrimination is adopted by a ﬁrm competing with an exogenous
number of competitors, but not when entry is endogenous. Accordingly, when
it takes place price discrimination is likely to harm at least some consumers.
The theory of endogenous entry will deliver a related and strong result on
horizontal mergers. As well known, even in the absence of cost eﬃciencies, these
mergers are often proﬁtable when entry is exogenous because they allow the
merged entity to increase prices or restrict production so as to enhance prof-
11itability. These eﬀects are counterproductive when entry is endogenous be-
cause any accommodating strategy attracts entry. Therefore, the only rationale
for mergers in markets with endogenous entry must be a cost eﬃciency large
enough to (more than) compensate the strategic disadvantages associated with
the merger. In these cases, mergers are welfare improving.
We will also develop some implications for the case in which collusive cartels
are organized between a restricted number of ﬁrms. These cartels, as any price
ﬁxing agreements, always lead to higher prices and lower welfare when the num-
ber of ﬁrms in the market is exogenous. However, when entry in the market is
endogenous collusive cartels are ineﬀective, unless they act as leaders. In this
last case, the cartels coordinate aggressive strategies aimed at increasing the
market shares of their members through low prices, and their implementation
is always sustainable and it does not harm consumers.
Finally, our theory can be applied to standard problems of strategic policy
to evaluate the role of state aids aimed at promoting exports. These are always
optimal when the domestic ﬁrms export in markets where entry is endogenous,
and they do not harm domestic or foreign consumers. Therefore, limitations to
state aids and export subsidies should be exempted when they concern ﬁrms
competing in international markets where entry is free.
3 Market leaders and endogenous entry
In this section I generalize the results derived in Etro (2006a, 2007a, 2008a) on
the characterization of equilibria with endogenous entry.
Consider n ﬁrms choosing a strategic variable xi > 0w i t hi =1 ,2,...,n.
They all compete in Nash strategies, that is taking as given the strategies of
each other. These strategies deliver for each ﬁrm i the net proﬁt function:
πi = Π(xi,β i) − F (1)
where F>0i saﬁxed cost of production. The ﬁr s ta r g u m e n ti st h es t r a t e g y
of ﬁrm i and I assume that gross proﬁts are quasiconcave in xi. The second
argument represents the eﬀects (or spillovers) induced by the strategies of the
other ﬁrms on ﬁrm i’s proﬁts, summarized by βi =
Pn
k=1,k6=i h(xk)f o rs o m e
function h(x) which is assumed positive, diﬀerentiable and increasing. These
spillovers exert a negative eﬀect on proﬁts, Π2 < 0. In general, the cross eﬀect
Π12 could be positive, so that we have strategic complementarity (SC), or neg-
a t i v es ot h a tw eh a v estrategic substitutability (SS). I will deﬁne strategy xi as
aggressive compared to strategy xj when xi >x j and accommodating when the
opposite holds.
Most of the commonly used models of oligopolistic competition in quanti-
ties and in prices are nested in our general speciﬁcation. For instance, con-
sider a market with quantity competition so that the strategy xi represents the







w h i c hi sd e c r e a s i n gi nb o t ha r g u m e n t s( g o o d sa r es u b -
stitutes). The cost function is c(xi)w i t hc0(·) > 0. It follows that gross proﬁts
for ﬁrm i are:
Π(xi,β i)=xip(xi,β i) − c(xi)( 2 )
Consider now models of price competition where pi is the price of ﬁrm i.A n y






,w h e r eD1 < 0, D2 <
0, g0(p) < 0, is nested in our general framework after setting xi ≡ 1/pi and
h(xi)=g(1/xi). This speciﬁcation guarantees that goods are substitutes in a
standard way since ∂Di/∂pj = D2g0(pj) > 0. Examples include models of price
competition with Logit demand, isoelastic demand and constant expenditure
demand and other demand functions as in the general class due to Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). Adopting, just for simplicity, a constant marginal cost c,w e













=( pi − c)D(pi,β i)( 3 )
which is nested in our general model and, under weak conditions assumed
through the paper, implies SC.
Our interest will be on the behavior of market leaders in these markets. Two
situations are usually studied in the literature. The simplest one requires the
leader choosing its own strategy before the other followers that simultaneoulsy
choose their strategies, and corresponds to Stackelberg competition. As well
known, when the number of ﬁrms n is exogenous and all ﬁrms obtain positive
proﬁts in the Stackelberg equilibrium, we obtain that the leader is accommodat-
ing compared to the followers under strategic complementarity and aggressive
under strategic substitutability. However, when entry is endogenous, we obtain
the following result:
Proposition 1 (Etro, 2008,a). A Stackelberg equilibrium with en-
dogenous entry always implies that the leader is aggressive com-
pared to each follower, and each follower either does not enter
or chooses the same strategy as in the Nash equilibrium with en-
dogenous entry.
The second situation studied in the literature (since Fudenberg and Ti-
role, 1984) involves a preliminary commitment by the leader on a variable
that aﬀects its own proﬁts. Imagine that the leader has the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
πL = ΠL (xi,β i,k) − F, where the last argument, k is a proﬁt enhancing fac-
tor (ΠL
3 > 0). The investment makes the leader tough when ΠL
13 > 0 (that is
an increase in k increases the marginal proﬁtability of its strategy), while the
investment makes the leader soft in the opposite case (ΠL
13 < 0).
As well known, when n is exogenous, we have the following traditional result
due to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984): with an exogenous number of ﬁrms: 1)
13when the leader is tough (ΠL
13 > 0), strategic over (under)-investment occurs
under SS (SC), inducing a “top dog” (“puppy dog”) strategy; 2) when the
leader is soft (ΠL
13 < 0), strategic under (over)-investment occurs under SS
(SC), inducing a “lean and hungry” (“fat cat”) strategy.
I will now follow Etro (2006a) and consider the case of endogenous entry
assuming that the number of potential entrants is great enough that a zero
proﬁt condition pins down the number of active ﬁrms, n. The equilibrium
conditions for a given preliminary investment k are the optimality conditions:
Π1 [x,(n − 2)h(x)+h(xL)] = 0 (4)
ΠL
1 [xL,(n − 1)h(x),k]=0 ( 5 )
plus the endogenous entry condition:
Π[x,(n − 2)h(x)+h(xL)] = F (6)
One can now prove that a change in the strategic commitment by the leader
does not aﬀect the equilibrium strategies of the other ﬁrms x, or the spillovers
from the strategies of the other ﬁrms β,b u ta ﬀects xL a c c o r d i n gt oaf u n c t i o n
x0
L(k) which can be easily derived. Using such a function, the optimal choice of









= f0(k)( 7 )
where the sign of the second term is just the sign of ΠL
13. This implies that the
leader has a positive strategic incentive to invest when it is tough (ΠL
13 > 0) and
a negative one when it is soft, independently from strategic substitutabilities or
complementarities.
Comparing the optimality conditions of the leader and the followers, we
have:
Proposition 2 (Etro, 2006a). Under Nash competition with endoge-
nous entry, when the strategic investment makes the leader tough
(soft), over (under)-investment occurs, but the leader is always
more aggressive than the other firms.
Basically, under endogenous entry, the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) boils down to two simple kinds of investment and an unambiguous ag-
gressive behavior in the market: whenever ΠL
13 > 0, it is always optimal to
adopt a “top dog” strategy with overinvestment in the ﬁrst stage so as to be
aggressive in the second stage; while when ΠL
13 < 0 we always have a “lean and
hungry” look with underinvestment, but the behavior in the second stage is still
aggressive. Strategic investment is always used as a commitment to be more
aggressive in a market with endogenous entry, and this does not depend on the
kind of competition or strategic interaction between the ﬁrms.
14In the rest of the paper, I will apply these results to particular commitments
or strategies with relevance for antitrust analysis. I will start with issues related
to abuse of dominance, and then I will comment on applications to mergers and
cartes. In conclusion I will deal with state aids, a topic occasionally included in
antitrust discussions.
4 Abuse of Dominance
The core issues of the endogenous entry approach to the behavior of market
leaders can be shown within a simple model of competition in quantities.
Consider a market with homogenous goods and an inverse demand p(X)
which is decreasing in the total production X. For a general cost function,
gross proﬁts of ﬁrm i are:
Π(xi,β i)=xip(X) − c(xi)
which are clearly nested in our framework. Consider a Stackelberg equilibrium
in quantities with endogenous entry. If we focus on a case in which marginal
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where   is the elasticity of demand and x is the equilibrium production of the





and these two conditions pin down the market price and the production of each
follower. Their number depends on the strategy of the leader, but now the
leader is aware that its output level will not aﬀect the market price. Therefore
the output that maximizes proﬁts πL = xLp(X) − c(xL) − F must satisfy the
simple condition:
p(X)=c0(xL) (10)
which completes the characterization of the equilibrium in this case. Notice
that the followers are producing below the optimal scale of production (which
satisﬁes c0(x)=( c(x)+F)/x), while the leader is producing above it: according
to Prop. 1, the leader is always aggressive (independently from the shape of the
demand and cost functions). In this basic framework, it is normal for the leader
to price at marginal cost. Nevertheless, such a rule guarantees positive proﬁts
to the leader.
Notice that when the marginal cost is not increasing enough, for instance
when it is constant, the equilibrium requires entry deterrence with a limit price
15that is low enough to make entry unproﬁtable. For instance with marginal cost
c and inverse demand p = a − X, the equilibrium price is:
p = c +2
√
F
The diﬀerence between this equilibrium and the one predicted by the contestable
market theory (Baumol et al., 1982) is that the latter corresponds to a Stack-
elberg equilibrium in prices with endogenous entry.8 Of course, our theory has
the advantage that it applies beyond the case of homogenous goods.
Summing up, market leaders facing endogenous entry price at marginal cost
when they face a steep cost function, while they set a limit price above the
marginal cost when the latter is ﬂat. In both cases, they obtain positive proﬁts
that are increasing in the ﬁxed costs of production.
While this was a simple application, similar results can be obtained when the
leader does not decide its strategy before the followers, but can simply commit
to a preliminary strategic investment. This more realistic situation will be the
focus of the following sections.
4.1 Cost reductions and signaling
Our ﬁrst application is about market pricing in standard markets and has im-
plications for the main post-Chicago approaches to predatory pricing (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1982). I will consider a situation where a ﬁrm can adopt prelim-
inary investments to improve its production technology and hence reduce its
costs. Traditional results on the opportunity of these investments for market
leaders are ambiguous when the number of ﬁr m si se x o g e n o u s ,b u t ,a sw ew i l l
show, they are not when entry is endogenous. From now on, we will assume for
simplicity that marginal costs are constant. Here, the leader can invest k and
reduce its marginal cost to c(k) > 0w i t hc0(k) < 0, while the marginal cost
cannot be changed for all the other ﬁrms. One could think of the cost reducing
investment as an investment in R&D to improve the production technology, but
also in terms of learning by doing: past production reduces future costs.
Consider ﬁrst a model of quantity competition. The gross proﬁto ft h el e a d e r
becomes:
ΠL (xL,β L,k)=xLp(xL,β L) − c(k)xL (11)
Notice that in such a model, ΠL
12 has an ambiguous sign, but we have:
ΠL
13 = −c0(k) > 0 (12)
8The contestable equilibrium requires a price of the incumbent equal to the average cost





a + c −
p
(a − c)2 − 4F
´
which is always lower than the equilibrium price under Stackelberg competition in quantities
with endogenous entry.
16consequently the leader will overinvest in cost reductions when facing a ﬁxed
number of competitors (as long as SS holds), and will always overinvest and
produce more than the other ﬁrms when entry is endogenous.
Consider now the model of price competition where the leader can invest to
reduce its marginal costs in the same way and its proﬁt function becomes:




L > 0 (14)
Accordingly, underinvestment in cost reductions emerges when entry is exoge-
nous (since SC holds), but overinvestment is optimal when there is endogenous
entry. Whenever this is the case, the leader wants to improve its cost function
to be more aggressive in the market and sell its good at a lower price. Sum-
marizing, under both quantity and price competition with endogenous entry, a
ﬁrm always has an incentive to overinvest in cost reductions and to be more
aggressive than the others in the market.9 This simple example shows that in
the presence of endogenous entry, market leaders always adopt aggressive pric-
ing strategies without having necessarily exclusionary purposes (which would
be the only reason to adopt aggressive price strategies in case of competition in
prices).
The same result can also be used to re-interpret models of predatory pricing
through cost signaling. In a classic work of the modern industrial organization
(and of the post-Chicago approach to antitrust), Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
have studied the entry decision of an entrant in a duopoly with an incumbent
that is already active in the market, and have introduced incomplete informa-
tion: since the study of informational asymmetries is beyond our current scope,
we will just sketch their idea to emphasize the similarities with our approach.
Imagine that the entrant does not know the cost of the leader, which can be a
high cost or a low cost, but would like to enter only when facing a high cost
leader. Milgrom and Roberts study under which conditions preliminary strate-
gies of the leader induce entry deterrence. For instance, a low cost leader can
signal its own eﬃciency through initial over-production or under-pricing (as-
sociated to a sacriﬁce of proﬁt s )a sl o n ga st h i si sr e l a t i v e l yc h e a p e rf o rt h e
low cost leader compared to the high cost one. This sorting or single crossing
condition is respected here exactly because the marginal proﬁtability of produc-
tion decreases with the marginal cost. In our terminology, this corresponds to
our condition ΠL
13 > 0: when the marginal cost is lower (c(k) is lower because
the investment k is higher), the marginal beneﬁts of an aggressive strategy is
higher. This means that the marginal cost of an aggressive strategy is lower for
al o wc o s tﬁrm. Then, in a separating equilibrium, a low cost leader is initially
aggressive overproducing enough to signal its eﬃciency and induce the follower
9A related point in a diﬀerent framework was made in Etro (2004, 2008b).
17not to enter, while a high cost leader does not imitate such a strategy because it
is more proﬁtable to behave monopolistically initially and accommodate entry
subsequently. This result shows that cost reductions can have a strategic role
also in the presence of incomplete information about costs. Notice that even
without exclusionary purposes, a leader may like to signal its own type to aﬀect
post-entry competition with incomplete information on costs. Under competi-
tion in quantities (and SS), a low cost leader may signal its eﬃciency to reduce
the equilibrium output of the entrant and increase its own, but under price
competition it is a high cost leader that wants to signal its ineﬃciency to induce
high prices by the entrant and obtain high proﬁts for both, a point ﬁrst made
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Without developing the argument in technical
details, we can point out that when entry is endogenous there can only be a
gain from signaling eﬃciency for a low cost incumbent, since signaling a high
cost would not soften price competition, but just induce further entry. In the
spirit of our model, we can conclude by suggesting that also under incomplete
information about costs, there is a role for a positive strategic investment in cost
reductions (for signaling purposes) whenever entry in the market is endogenous.
And this does not necessarily imply exclusionary aims.
4.2 Network externalities
Many markets are characterized by network externalities, in the sense that de-
mand is enhanced by past production and the consequent diﬀusion of the prod-
uct across customers. This may happen for cultural or social reasons, for in-
stance because goods become fashionable when they have been already chosen
by other customers, or because of technological reasons, for instance because
the willingness to pay for a good by each consumer depends on how many other
consumers have the same good. The classic study of competition in this kind of
markets is due to Katz and Shapiro (1985). Here I will focus on a more stylized
model of the behavior of market leaders in the presence of network externalities.
I will adopt the simplest model of quantity competition with homogeneous
goods and introduce a time dimension. Imagine that in a ﬁrst period the leader
is alone in the market and produces k facing the inverse demand p(k)a n da
marginal cost c. In the second period other ﬁrms compete in quantities and
the leader faces the inverse demand p(X)φ(k), where X is total production and
φ(k) is some increasing function of past production, which is a measure of the
diﬀu s i o no ft h eg o o db e t w e e nc o n s u m e r s ,a nd induces network externalities.
The gross proﬁt function for the leader becomes:
ΠL (xL,β L,k)=kp(k) − ck + δ[p(X)φ(k)xL − cxL] (15)
where δ ≤ 1 is the discount factor, while the net proﬁto ft h eo t h e rﬁrms
is simply πi = xip(X) − cxi − F. Since the other ﬁrms do not enjoy network
eﬀects, one can easily show that in a free entry equilibrium the future production
18xL(k) of the leader will be increasing in its initial production with ∂xL/∂k =






which, according to our general principle, shows that the leader will always
engage in initial overproduction to be more aggressive when the market opens
up to endogenous entry. We can also derive a simple expression for the optimal
initial production:




This rule equates the marginal revenue of initial production to its eﬀective mar-
ginal cost, which includes the myopic marginal cost c, a second term that repre-
sents the direct beneﬁtd u et ot h en e t w o r ke ﬀects on future demand (determining
what is sometimes called a penetration price), and a last term representing the
indirect (strategic) beneﬁts due to the commitment to the adoption of a more
aggressive strategy in the future. Notice that in the presence of network exter-
nalities, an incumbent expecting strong competition in the market may want to
price well below marginal cost not with the purpose of excluding any other ﬁrm
to enter in the market, but to be able to compete aggressively in the future: this
is more likely when the marginal costs of production are low and the discount
factor is high. Summarizing we have:
Proposition 4. In markets with network externalities an incum-
bent has an incentive to overproduce initially so as to be more
aggressive when endogenous entry takes place in the future.
4.3 Multi-sided markets
The model of the previous section can be re-interpreted in an interesting way
when we assume that the externality function is simply φ(k)=k. This implies
that net proﬁts in the competitive market are proportional to kxL.T oﬁxi d e a s ,
imagine that the ﬁrms under consideration produce local newspapers. The
leader decides a capacity production for k copies of its local newspaper, but
also sells advertising space on the newspaper in quantity xL and in competition
with other newspapers (located elsewhere and with their own local readers).
Of course, advertising is more valuable when a newspaper has more readers,
and more precisely what matters is exactly the number of interactions between
readers and advertisement, which is simply k·xL.T h i si st h es i m p l e s te x a m p l eo f
a two-sided market because newspapers sell two products (news and advertising)
to diﬀerent customers, and there are network eﬀects between them (actually only
in one direction in this example, since we assumed that readers are indiﬀerent
t ot h es i z eo fa d v e r t i s e m e n ts p a c eo nt h en e w s p a p e r s ) .
19As ﬁrst pointed out by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006),
in such a two-sided market ﬁrms charge the diﬀerent sides in diﬀerent ways
with the aim of enhancing network eﬀects: in general the aim is to get on
board many agents from the side whose size creates more value for the other
side. In our example, for instance, the direct eﬀect of the sales of newspapers
(and maybe related bundled gadgets) on the proﬁts from advertising induces
a production beyond the myopic monopolistic output level. However, here we
want to point out a new strategic element: a leader facing competition on one
side (advertising), will have an additional indirect incentive to overproduce on
the other side (newspapers), to enhance the value of the platform and to be
aggressive in the competition with other ﬁrms (for the advertising).
One can verify that the same happens under price competition, which is
the usual assumption in models of two-sided markets. However, under SC,
overproduction by the leader is strictly related with the endogeneity of entry.
When the number of competitors is exogenous, a leader would like to commit
to (relatively) high prices for the newspapers so as to be accommodating in the
competition for advertising space against other newspapers: only when entry is
endogenous the need of being aggressive in the advertising market induces to
price newspapers at a (relatively) low price.10
Similar situations emerge in many multi-sided markets where platforms com-
pete on the volume of transactions between diﬀerent groups of buyers and sellers
(think of credit cards, operating systems) and multiple factors can induce dif-
ferent strategic behavior toward diﬀerent sides. For instance, consider a variant
of the previous example where both sides are now charged for each interaction,
10More formally, consider the simplest case of a monopolistic platform charging a group,
say the buyers, a price pB per interaction with the other group, say the sellers, and charging
the sellers a price pS per interaction with the buyers. If total demand of interactions is D(pB)
for the buyers and D(pS) for the sellers, the number of interactions is D(pB)D(pS). Given a
marginal cost per interaction c the proﬁts of the platform are:
π =( pB + pS − c)D(pB)D(pS)
whose maximization provides the following Rochet-Tirole (2003) rule pB +pS −c = pB/ B =
pS/ S,w h e r e i is the elasticity of demand for i = B,S. Strategic reasons may bias the
pricing structure of platform leaders. In the example of the previous footnote, suppose product
diﬀerentiation on one side occurs and, with the usual notation, proﬁts of a representative ﬁrm
are:
π =( pB + pS − c)D(pB)D(pS,β S)
Suppose that the leader can commit to a price for the buyers, while, for simplicity, the others
are given. Firms compete on the prices for the sellers. To verify the incentives of the leader,
notice that (with k =1 /pB as preliminary commitment) we have:
ΠL
13(1/pS,β S,1/pB)=( pSpB)2 D(pB)D1(pS,β S) < 0
Assuming that SC holds, this implies that when entry is not free the leader will tend to
underprice buyers to be accomodating in the competition for the sellers. However, when
entry in the platform competition is endogenous, the leader will tend to overprice buyers to
be aggressive in the competition for the sellers.
20and c is the marginal cost of an interaction, so that:
ΠL (xL,β L,k)=[ p(k)+p(X) − c] · k · xL (18)
In case the leader is just a monopolist, k and x would be chosen to satisfy the
Rochet-Tirole (2003) optimality condition:










where  (x)=−p(x)/xp0(x) is the elasticity of demand: the side whose demand
is more elastic should be charged relatively more because this keeps demand on
both sides balanced and maximizes the volume of interactions for a given total
price (of course, in case of a corner solution with supply such that one side is
not charged, the optimal mark up on the other side follows the standard inverse
elasticity rule). Now, imagine that the leading platform competes on one side,
but can commit to output k on the other side. Since:
ΠL
13 = p0(k)k<0 (20)
there is a strategic incentive to commit to underproduction to be more aggressive
on the competitive side. Leaders may alter the Rochet-Tirole rule leading to
charge more one side to create strategic eﬀects on the competitors on the other
side. Market relations easily become complex when network eﬀects act in both
directions (in the case of informative advertising, readers may have positive
externalities from more advertising in the newspapers), and especially when one
or both sides engage in multi-homing (in case of national newspapers, readers
m a yr e a dm o r et h a no n eo ft h e m ) .
4.4 Predatory pricing
The standard antitrust approach uses a number of cost benchmarks in order
to assess whether “predatory pricing” by a dominant undertaking has actually
taken place, and in particular it sets a cut-oﬀ such that pricing below this cut-
oﬀ gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the pricing is predatory. This
strategy is supported by the traditional idea that pricing below marginal cost
should have an exclusionary purpose in standard markets, while pricing above
marginal cost should not.
The theory of endogenous entry emphasizes some limits of this way of think-
ing: pricing at or below marginal cost by the market leader does not need to
exclude (equally eﬃcient) competitors and it does not even need to induce short
run losses for the same leader. To see why, let us remember that a leader in a
standard market with quantity competition and endogenous entry can generally
choose between two alternative strategies. The ﬁrst one is to price below the
rivals and allow their entry with a price equal to their average cost but above
21the marginal cost. The second strategy is to choose a limit price such that entry
is not proﬁtable for any ﬁrm. The former strategy is optimal when marginal
costs are increasing enough in the production level and/or products are diﬀeren-
tiated, while the latter strategy is optimal in the case of decreasing or constant
marginal costs and/or homogenous goods.
Let us focus on the ﬁrst situation. When goods are homogenous, the equi-
librium strategy of the leader is simply to price at marginal cost, and its proﬁts
are positive because production is in the region where average total costs are
increasing. When goods are diﬀerentiated, the equilibrium price of the leader is
above its marginal cost, and proﬁts are again positive. As we have seen, in this
equilibrium entry occurs, and is not deterred. Moreover, if the leader can obtain
positive proﬁts in equilibrium by pricing at marginal cost, positive proﬁts could
be preserved even by pricing slightly below marginal cost as long as the scale of
production is large enough.
Let us focus on the second situation now. The leader can deter entry when
marginal costs are constant or decreasing and/or goods are homogenous, and
this happens with a price of the leader above the marginal cost. Nevertheless,
when entry is endogenous this is a normal competitive strategy of a ﬁrm able
to exploit scale economies and reduce average costs of production.
Finally, we saw that in dynamic (and multi-sided) markets where demand
is characterized by network externalities, leaders may want to price below the
marginal cost without entry deterrence purposes. The purpose of pricing below
marginal cost would be to develop network eﬀects or decrease costs for the
future and to be more aggressive in the future competition. In conclusion, it is
questionable that the marginal cost should be the right theoretical cut-oﬀ below
which predation can be presumed, and we do believe that a rule of reason should
be applied also in this case, because diﬀerent sectors and diﬀe r e n tc o s ta n d
demand structures require diﬀerent approaches to the deﬁnition of predatory
pricing.
On the basis of our theoretical discussion, we can now try to draw our
conclusions on the proper approach to predatory pricing. As we have noticed,
one can not judge the pricing behavior of a market leader in a correct way
without taking the entry conditions into account. When entry is endogenous,
in the practical sense that entry is driven by proﬁtable opportunities and it
is rapid, no ﬁrm can manipulate the market at its will. As McGee (1958)
noticed in his pioneering work on predatory pricing, a necessary condition for
the success, and therefore the viability, of a predatory strategy is that entry
must be exogenously blocked: “Obstacles to entry are necessary conditions for
success. Entry is the nemesis of monopoly. It is foolish to monopolize an area
or market into which entry is quick and easy. Moreover, monopolization that
produces a ﬁrm of greater than optimum size is in for trouble if entry can occur
even over a longer period. In general, monopolization will not pay if there is
no special qualiﬁcation for entry, or no relatively long gestation period for the
facilities that must be committed for successful entry.”
22Only when entry is not feasible (even when it could be proﬁtable), a leader
can hope to exclude the current rivals and monopolize the market.
On the basis of these considerations, we propose the following modiﬁcation
of the Areeda-Turner (1974) rule based on two steps:
1) the Antitrust Authority should evaluate whether the undertaking is eﬀec-
tively constrained by endogenous entry of competitors in his strategic choices: if
entry is endogenous dismiss the case, otherwise proceed.
2) the Antitrust Authority should evaluate the relation between price, average
total cost (ATC) and average variable cost (AVC):
a) a price above ATC should be lawful without exceptions;
b) a price below ATC but above AVC should be presumed lawful with the
burden of proving the contrary on the Antitrust Authority, and on the basis of
the consequences on consumers and allocative eﬃciency;
c) a price below AVC should be presumed unlawful with the burden of proving
the contrary on the undertaking, through an eﬃciency defense or proving that
demand or technological conditions (as the presence of network eﬀects or multi-
sided demand, reduce the relevant cut-oﬀ below the AVC.
Notice that the ﬁrst step we propose is diﬀerent from the traditional one,
which simply evaluates whether there is a dominant position in the relevant
market. The traditional step is based on the idea that after excluding the
rivals, a dominant ﬁrm can monopolize the market and recoup its initial losses
with higher prices. But, this is impossible when entry in the competition in the
market is endogenous (there is no way to recoup losses by increasing future prices
if a price increase attracts entry).11 The traditional deﬁnition of dominance
(associated with the market share and the related indexes of concentration)
should not be the relevant element to establish the likelihood of recoupment.
We believe that the focus should not be on the market leader in the ﬁrst step of
an antitrust investigation for abuse of dominance, but on the followers and on
the chances that these followers have to exploit proﬁtable opportunities in the
market.
4.5 Tying
There has been a lot of attention in the economic literature on the rationale for
tying (bundling) products rather than selling them separately. A fundamental
reason for this is that many antitrust cases have focused on such a practice as
an anti-competitive one.
According to the traditional leverage theory of tied good sales, monopolists
would bundle their products with others for competitive or partially competi-
tive markets to extend their monopolistic power. Such a view as been criticized
11Such recoupment is also extremely unlikely when entry in the competition for the market
is endogenous (there is a low probability to recoup losses by increasing future prices of goods
that may be soon replaced by innovations of other ﬁrms)
23by the Chicago school because it would erroneously claim that a ﬁrm can ar-
tiﬁcially increase monopolistic proﬁts from a competitive market. Bundling
should have diﬀerent motivations, as price discrimination or creation of joint
economies, whose welfare consequences are ambiguous and sometimes even pos-
itive. Whinston (1990) has changed the terms of the discussion trying to verify
how a monopolist can aﬀect strategic interaction with competitors in another
market by bundling. His main ﬁnding is that bundling tends to strengthen price
competition against these competitors, hence the only reason why a monopolist
could bundle is to deter entry in the secondary market. However, here will we
show that, when entry is endogenous, bundling may become the optimal “top
dog” (aggressive) strategy.
Imagine that a monopolistic market is characterized by zero costs of produc-
tion and unitary demand at price v, which corresponds to the valuation of the
good alone. Another market is characterized by standard price competition, a
ﬁxed cost F and a constant marginal cost c.G r o s s p r o ﬁts for the monopolist
without bundling are:
πM = v +( pM − c)D(pM,β M) − F (21)
while proﬁts for the other ﬁrms are πi =( pi − c)D(pi,β i) − F.I n B e r t r a n d
equilibrium with endogenous entry the monopolist enjoys the proﬁts πM = v.
Under bundling, demand for the monopolist is constrained by demand for the
other good, which is assumed less than unitary. The bundle price corresponds to
PM = v0+pM,w h e r ev0 ≥ v is the valuation of the primary good when bundled
with a secondary good of the same ﬁrm: this maybe higher for eﬃciency reasons,
complementarities or network externalities of diﬀerent kind. In such a case, the
proﬁts for the monopolist become:
πMB =( PM − c)D(PM − v0,β M) − F =( pM + v0 − c)D(pM,β M) − F
while the other ﬁrms have the same objective function as before. In Bertrand
equilibrium the monopolist chooses the price PM = pM + v0 satisfying:
(PM − c)D1 [pM,(n − 1)g(p)] + D[pM,(n − 1)g(p)] = 0 (22)
w h i l ee a c ho n eo ft h eo t h e rﬁrms chooses p satisfying:
(p − c)D1 [p,g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p)] + D[p,g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p)] = 0 (23)
If endogenous entry holds, the number of ﬁrms satisﬁes also:
(p − c)D[p,g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p)] = F (24)
so that the proﬁt of the monopolist becomes πMB =( PM − c)D[pM,(n − 1)g(p)].
Notice that if we deﬁne β = g(pM)+( n − 2)g(p) the equilibrium spillovers re-
ceived by the entrants as a consequence of the price chosen by their competitors,
24the equilibrium conditions (23)-(24) jointly determine p and β independently
from the price of the monopolist. Using βM = β +g(p)−g(pM)w ec a nr e w r i t e
the equilibrium ﬁrst order condition of the monopolist as an implicit expres-
sion for pM = pM(v0), and immediately derive that the equilibrium price of the
secondary good decided by the monopolist has to be decreasing in v0.12
Clearly, bundling is optimal if πMB >π M. We need to verify under which
conditions this happens. Let us look at the way in which bundling changes the
strategy of the monopolist. Since ∂πMB/∂pM−∂πM/∂pM = v0D1 < 0, bundling
makes the monopolist tough. This implies that the monopolist is led to reduce
the eﬀective price in the other market by choosing a low price of the bundle.
Since SC holds, a price decrease by the monopolist induces the other ﬁrms to
reduce their prices. Under exogenous entry, as in the Whinston (1990) model
with two ﬁrms, this reduces proﬁts of all ﬁrms in the secondary market, hence
bundling is never optimal unless it manages to deter entry. Under endogenous
entry, however, this result can change: bundling can now be an eﬀective device
to outplace some of the other ﬁrms without fully deterring entry in the secondary
market, but creating some proﬁts for the monopolist in this market through an
aggressive strategy. In particular, bundling is optimal if the low price of the
bundle increases proﬁts in the competitive market more than it reduces them
in the monopolistic one. It is easy to verify that bundling is optimal if:
[pM(v0) − c]D[pM(v0),β M] − F>v− v0D[pM(v0),β M]
whose left hand side is the gain in proﬁts in the competitive market and whose
right hand side is the loss in proﬁts in the monopolistic market:
Proposition 5. Under price competition with endogenous entry in
a secondary market, a monopolist in a primary market can have an
incentive to bundle both goods to be aggressive.
It is important to remark that, in this case, bundling does not need to have
an exclusionary purpose as assumed by the leverage theory of tied good sales.
The reduction in the price of the two bundled goods together can also beneﬁt
consumers. This is even more likely when they are complements, when there
are network externalities between products, or when bundling creates eﬃciency
eﬀects.
Bundling is an example of a discrete strategy: a ﬁrm either bundles two
goods or not. A similar story can be used to evaluate a related discrete strat-
12In particular we have:
dpM
dv0 =
−D1 [pM,β+ g(p) − g(pM)]
∆
< 0
where ∆ ≡ 2D1 +( pM + v0 − c)[D11 − g0(pM)D12] − g0(pM)D2 < 0 by the stability of the
equilibrium system. In other words, the price of the bundle increases less than proportionally
with v0 or the monopolist oﬀers the bundle with a discount on the secondary good compared
to its competitors.
25egy, the choice of product compatibility and system compatibility,o ri n t e r o p -
erability: as Tirole (1988, p. 335) has correctly noticed, “a manufacturer that
makes its system incompatible with other systems imposes a de facto tie-in.”
Typically, product compatibility softens price competition because consumers
can mix and match products of diﬀerent ﬁrms: these products endogenously be-
come complements, while they would be substitutes in case of incompatibility.
S i n c ep r i c ec u t sa r em o r ep r o ﬁtable when competing products are substitutes
rather than complements, interoperability softens price competition (Matutes
and Regibeau, 1988).
Therefore, according to the standard outcome under price competition with
an exogenous number of competitors, the only reason why a leader would choose
a low level of interoperability would be to induce their exit from the market. On
the contrary, our results suggest that, when entry in the market is endogenous, a
leader may favour a limited level of interoperability for a diﬀerent purpose than
entry deterrence: just because this strategy would strengthen price competition
and enhance the gains from a low pricing strategy in the system competition,
that is the competition between alternative systems.
4.6 Third degree price discrimination
Our results have also implications for price discrimination, and in particular
third degree price discrimination (ﬁrms discriminate on the basis of observable
characteristics), a crucial issue in antitrust policy. When ﬁrms sell the same
good at diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent consumers, they are adopting a policy of
price discrimination. Typically this increases proﬁtability, but requires a certain
commitment, because similar goods must be sold not only at diﬀerent prices for
diﬀerent consumers, but also in diﬀerent packages and with diﬀerent advertising.
For simplicity, imagine that all ﬁrms compete simultaneously for a common
set of consumers, whose demand is DA(pi,β i)f o re a c hﬁrm i, and the leader
also serves a local market with demand ˜ DB(pi) (we assume that has to serve
both markets simultaneously). The leader can commit to a policy of price
discrimination, and then choose two separate prices pA
L and pB
L for the same
good sold at diﬀerent kinds of customers. The marginal cost of production is c
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i ,β i) − F
Otherwise the leader can adopt a uniform pricing policy and choose a unique
price pL for both kinds of customers, with the same proﬁtf u n c t i o na sa b o v e .
The idea behind the commitment to discriminate is that price discrimination
26requires a small preliminary investment in package diversiﬁcation and separate
advertising for the products sold for the diﬀerent kind of customers.
Consider the case of an exogenous number of ﬁrms. Choosing price discrim-
ination, the leader sets the two prices, say pA
L >p B
L, and obtains monopolistic
proﬁts in the local market and (given symmetry) the same proﬁts as the other
ﬁrms in the symmetric Bertrand equilibrium for the common market. Choos-
ing uniform pricing, the leader chooses an intermediate price pL ∈ (pB
L,p A
L)i n
Bertrand equilibrium, and SC implies that also the other ﬁrms will reduce their
equilibrium prices. Ultimately, the leader reduces its proﬁts in the local mar-
ket and strengthens competition in the common market. Clearly, in this case,
price discrimination is the optimal choice, since it allows the leader to maximize
proﬁts in the local market and to soften competition in the common one.
Consider endogenous entry now. Under price discrimination, all ﬁrms choose
t h es a m ep r i c epA
L in the common market and entry drives proﬁts to zero in this
market, while the leader enjoys only its monopolistic proﬁts in the local market
setting the optimal price pB
L. Assume again that the demand conditions are
such that pA
L >p B
L. In this case, by adopting uniform pricing, the leader will
choose an intermediate price between pB
L and pA
L, and will obtain two results: on
one side, proﬁts in the local market will decrease because pricing is above mo-
nopolistic pricing, on the other side, proﬁts in the common market will increase
because the leader is endogenously committed to aggressive pricing, which is
always optimal in a market where entry is endogenous. If the former loss is
smaller than the latter gain, it is optimal to adopt uniform pricing rather than
committing to price discrimination.13
This simple example is just aimed a suggesting that price discrimination
can have a role in softening price competition (compared to uniform pricing)
inducing negative consequences for consumers: this eﬀect, however, is less likely
to emerge in markets where entry is endogenous, since in these markets an
aggressive uniform pricing strategy can be optimal. In conclusion, we may have
a possible new case for the association of price discrimination by market leaders
with anti-competitive purposes.
Ad i ﬀerent situation emerges if the demand conditions are such that under
price discrimination we have pA
L <p B
L. Then, with exogenous entry, a uniform
price by the leader increases prices and proﬁts in market A and reduces them
in market B, with ambiguous consequences, while with endogenous entry price
discrimination is always optimal (and if it is not allowed, the leader is better oﬀ
not serving market A).
4.7 Interbrand competition and vertical restraints
Vertical restraints are agreements or contracts between vertically related ﬁrms.
When these restraints improve the coordination of a vertical chain, they are
13Notice that this can happen because the loss from a small deviation from monopolistic
pricing is a second order loss, while the gain in the common market is a ﬁrst order gain.
27typically welfare improving, however, when they aﬀect interbrand competition,
that is competition between diﬀerent products and diﬀerent vertical chains,
they can induce adverse consequences on consumers: namely they can be used
to keep prices high. This is the standard result of the theory of strategic verti-
cal restraints in interbrand competition (Bonanno and Vickers, 1988; Rey and
Stiglitz, 1988), which suggests that, as long as ﬁrms compete in prices, a ﬁrm has
incentives to choose vertical separation and charge his retailer a francise fee to-
gether with a wholesale price above marginal cost to induce an accommodating
behavior.
Consider an upstream ﬁrm that produces a good at marginal cost c and
ﬁxed cost F, and delegates its distribution on the market to a downstream ﬁrm
through a contract implying a ﬁxed fee Υ and a wholesale price w for the good.
The downstream ﬁrm sells this same good at the price pD to maximize net
proﬁts:
πD =( pD − w)D(pD,β D) − Υ (26)
while the other ﬁrms, that are vertically integrated and face the same cost struc-
ture, have the standard proﬁtf u n c t i o nπi =( pi−c)D(pi,β i)−F. The upstream
ﬁrm can preliminarily choose the optimal contract, meaning the wholesale price
w and the fee Υ that maximize net proﬁts:
πU =( w − c)D(pD,β D)+Υ − F (27)
It is always optimal to choose w such that the proﬁts of the downstream ﬁrm
are maximized, and the fee that fully expropriates these proﬁts. Of course, a
choice w = c would be neutral for the market outcome. However, Bonanno
and Vickers (1988) have shown that, if competition is between an exogenous
number of ﬁrms, it is optimal to choose a high wholesale price w>cto soften
price competition, and increase prices compared to the outcome in which the
ﬁrm is vertically integrated. This is the classic example of an anti-competitive
vertical restraints adopted by a market leader through strategic delegation of
accommodating pricing.
When entry in the market is endogenous, the market leader cannot operate
as above, because high wholesale prices would put the downstream ﬁrm out of
the market. A market leader can still gain from delegating pricing decisions,
but the optimal contract is now radically diﬀerent. In particular, we know from
our general results, that competition in prices with endogenous entry between
the downstream ﬁrm and the other ﬁrms would lead to a price pD(w)i n c r e a s i n g
in the wholesale price for the downstream ﬁr m ,ap r i c ef o rt h eo t h e rﬁrms
p = pD(c) and an endogenous value for β that are both independent from w,




πU =( w − c)D[pD(w),β D(w)] + Υ − F
s.v. : πD =[ pD(w) − w]D[pD(w),β D(w)] − Υ ≥ 0
28and requires a wholesale price for the retailer smaller than the marginal cost
and implicitly given by:




This wholesale price generates a lower equilibrium price and higher output for
t h ed o w n s t r e a mr e t a i l e rt h a nf o rt h eo t h e rﬁrms, but generates positive proﬁts.
Summing up:
Proposition 6. Under price competition with endogenous entry,
it is optimal to delegate distribution to a downstream retailer
with a francise fee contract involving a wholesale price below
marginal cost so as to induce an aggressive pricing.
In such a case, the vertical restraint leads to a lower price for the consumers
and there is no ground for conjecturing any anti-competitive behavior.14 There-
fore, also in the case of vertical restraints aﬀecting interbrand competition, entry
conditions are crucial to derive proper conclusions.
5M e r g e r s
We have seen that even when they face endogenous entry of competitors, market
leaders can obtain positive proﬁts by adopting certain strategic commitments.
One may think that a preliminary merger with other ﬁrms and a subsequent co-
operation in the strategic decisions may serve a similar role. When the number
of ﬁrms in the market is given, this is typically the case. Moreover, a merger
induces a more accommodating behavior which exerts an indirect eﬀect on the
other ﬁrms. When SS holds the other ﬁrms become more aggressive (Salant
et al., 1983), when SC holds they become more accommodating as well (De-
neckere and Davidson, 1985): for this reason, loosely speaking, mergers tend to
be more proﬁtable under competition in prices. However, once again, the situ-
ation changes when entry is endogenous. In such a case the merger can aﬀect
entry, which creates a new eﬀect, often taken into account in antitrust policy
considerations, but not in the theory of mergers.15 In our context, a merger
induces accommodation by the merged ﬁrm, which attracts entry and reduces
the proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm: consequently, there is no any strategic rationale
for mergers when entry in the market is endogenous.16
14A similar result emerges also in models of competition in quantities, but this is less
surprising since it conﬁrms the outcome of delegation games with an exogenous number of
competitors.
15An exception is in the independent work of Davidson and Mukherjee (2007), that extends
the endogenous entry framework to the case of mergers between ﬁrms producing homogenous
goods, and especially in the work of Erkal and Piccinin (2007,a), that extends the analysis to
t h ec a s eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation.
16See Motta (Ch. 5) for a survey of the literature on horizontal mergers. He points out
that “the ﬁrms’ ability to raise prices after a merger is also limited by the existence of po-
29Consider a merger between two ﬁrms, say ﬁrms k and j.T h en e tp r o ﬁts of
the merged ﬁrms become:
πMerger = Π(xk,β k)+Π(xj,β j) − ˜ F
where ˜ F is the new ﬁxed cost of production. Using the fact that βj = βk +
h(xk) − h(xj)f o rk,j =1 ,2, we have the ﬁrst order conditions:
Π1(xk,β k)+Π2(xj,β j)h0(xk)=0 k,j =1 ,2 (29)
which clearly shows an accommodating behavior for both strategies. As we
know, such a behavior creates a strategic disadvantage when entry in the market
is endogenous. The equilibrium after the merger is characterized by two identical
strategies for the merged ﬁrm, xk = xj = xM, a strategy for the followers x,
and respective spillovers βM and β such that:
Π1(xM,β M)+Π2(xM,β M)h0(xM)=Π1(x,β)=0 , Π(x,β)=F
This implies xM <xand βM >β : the equilibrium strategy of the other ﬁrms
i sa l w a y st h es a m ea f t e rt h em e r g e r ,b u tt h ea c c o m m o d a t i n gb e h a v i o ro ft h e
merged entity induces further entry so as to decrease its gross proﬁts below
those of each independent ﬁrm. Nevertheless, the merger can still be prof-
itable if πMerger > 0, which requires ˜ F<2Π(xM,β M). In a market where
entry is endogenous, the only way a merger can be proﬁtable is by creating
cost eﬃciencies.17 This conclusion exactly matches the informal insights of the
Chicago school on horizontal mergers, and can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7. In a market with endogenous entry, a horizontal
merger induces accommodating behavior of the merged firm and
attracts entry of other firms: the merger is profitable if and
only if it creates enough cost efficiencies to compensate for the
strategic disadvantage of the merged firm.
Notice that in models of competition in quantities and prices, as long as the
merged ﬁrm does not deter entry, the equilibrium after the merger implies the
same total production or the same price indexes as before. Therefore, consumer
surplus is not aﬀected by the merger. Since the latter takes place only when there
are signiﬁcant cost eﬃciencies, it follows that horizontal mergers in markets
where entry is endogenous are welfare improving.18
tential entrants. Firms which would ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to enter the industry at pre-merger
prices might decide to enter if the merger brings about higher prices or lower quantities. By
anticipating this eﬀect, post-merger prices might not rise at all” (p. 236).
17For instance, in the linear model of com p e t i t i o ni nq u a n t i t i e s ,t h em e r g e dﬁrm would
produce the same as the two separate ﬁrms, therefore the merger could be proﬁtable only if
˜ F<F . In a model with imperfect substitutability and demand pi = a − xi − bβi,am e r g e r
between two ﬁrms would lead them to produce 2 − b times as before and to reach the joint
proﬁts πMerger =( 2− b)(2 + b − b2)F/2 − ˜ F which are positive if product diﬀerentiation is
strong enough (b small).
18The Erkal-Piccinin model extends the analysis to more complex demand functions: under
306C a r t e l s
One of the main objectives of antitrust policy is the elimination of forms of
collusion between ﬁrms aimed at increasing prices. As well known, a collusive
cartel for the choice of prices or quantities between an exogenous number of ﬁrms
ends up increasing prices and harming consumers. When a restricted number of
ﬁrms collude, they can still implement accommodating strategies and increase
their equilibrium prices and proﬁts (especially if they act as leaders). The
reaction of the other ﬁrms to their collusive strategies can be either aggressive
under SS or accommodating under SC, but the outcome is qualitatively similar
to the previous one: when it takes place, collusion in a market with an exogenous
number of ﬁrms tends to harm consumers. In this section we will examine a
diﬀerent, but related, issue: the impact of collusion between a restricted number
of ﬁrms in a market where entry is endogenous. In such a case, collusion has
unusual eﬀects.
More formally, let us consider a collusive cartel between m ﬁrms, where their




Π(xk,β k) − mF (30)
while the other ﬁrms i = m +1 ,...,n, maximize their simple proﬁts πi =
Π(xi,β i) − F and enter until these net proﬁts are zero.
In a hypothetical Nash equilibrium between the cartel and the outsider ﬁrms,
each member of the cartel would implement an accommodating strategy accord-




Π2(xq,β q)h0(xk)=0 f o rk =1 ,2,...,m
while the outsiders would stick to the usual optimality conditions Π1(xi,β i)=0 .
Notice that the accommodating strategies of the members of the cartel would
attract entry until the cartel becomes a lossmaker: in a symmetric equilibrium, a
simple commitment to collusion is not proﬁtable when entry is endogenous (this
is another application of our results in Prop. 1, since the collusive commitment
makes the members of the cartel more accommodating).19
However, a commitment to join in a cartel can be proﬁtable when the mem-
bers of the cartel act as leaders in the competition with the other ﬁrms. More
competition in prices with a demand system derived from a quadratic utility function, a
merger increases the prices of the merged ﬁrms and reduces the prices of the other ﬁrms while
increasing entry (nevertheless, in the absence of cost eﬃciencies, the impact on consumer
s u r p l u si st y p i c a l l yn e g a t i v e ) .
19For a related result see Erkal and Piccinin (2007,b) who show that R&D cartels are not
proﬁtable under free entry.
31formally, consider a game in which the cartel plays ﬁrst, then the followers en-
ter, and ﬁnally the followers play simultaneously. In this case, the optimality
condition of the followers and their zero proﬁt condition pin down their strat-
egy x and their spillovers β independently from the strategies of the cartel.20
Therefore, taking into account that the expected spillover of a member of the
cartel is βk =
P
j6=k h(xj)=β + h(x) − h(xk), the optimal strategies of the






Π[xk,β+ h(x) − h(xk)] − mF
The corresponding optimality conditions are:
Π1(xk,β k)=Π2(xk,β k)h0(xk)f o r k =1 ,2,...,m
But these conditions exactly correspond to the condition deﬁning the equilib-
rium strategy of a leader (or more leaders) in the Stackelberg equilibrium with
endogenous entry. On this basis, we can apply all the results derived in the rest
of this chapter. In the case of competition in quantities, a collusive cartel in a
market where entry is endogenous would coordinate an increase in the output
of its members so as to increase their market shares and improve the allocation
of resources. In the case of competition in prices, the cartel would coordinate
a reduction of the prices of its members to increase their market shares, and
this would lead to an improvement in the allocation of resources.21 We can
summarize our result as follows:
Proposition 8. In a market with endogenous entry, a collusive
cartel is not effective unless it acts as a leader: in such a case, as
long as there is endogenous entry of some followers, each member
of the cartel is aggressive compared to each follower.
Paradoxically, collusion in markets where entry is endogenous turns out be-
ing proﬁtable, sustainable22 and also pro-competitive. This result should not be
overemphasized from a policy point of view. It suggests that harmful collusion
between a restricted number of ﬁrms of a market cannot occur when there is
endogenous entry of other ﬁrms in the market, as already pointed out within
the Chicago school. However, most of the time, collusive cartels involve all the
ﬁrms of an oligopolistic market and are harmful to consumers: their avoidance
should be the main focus of antitrust authorities.
20We focus on the case in which the number of members of the cartel is small and entry
takes place in equilibrium. If this is not the case, the cartel deters entry.
21Under competition for the market an R&D cartel acting as a leader under endogenous
entry would enhance investments in R&D for its members.
22Since the cartel with m members implements the same strategies as in the Stackelberg
equilibrium with m leaders and endogenous entry, collusion is always sustainable.
327 State Aids
Globalization leads to the intensiﬁcation of competition on international markets
and requires a deeper understanding of the eﬀects of industrial policy at large
in the international environment. In this section we present a discussion on the
optimal state aid policy for exporting ﬁrms with particular reference to subsidies
for exports, a topic on which there are contrasting views at both the policy and
theoretical level - therefore we will not deal with other forms of state aids, for
which our approach does not provide additional insights.
It is important to understand whether state aids to exporting ﬁrms and
export subsidies are beneﬁcial (as unilateral policies) and what are their conse-
quences for international markets. Economic theory is largely ambiguous on this
point. In the neoclassical trade theory with perfect competition, for instance,
export subsidies are not optimal because they deteriorate the terms of trade. In
case of imperfect competition, export promotion assumes a strategic dimension,
so its main aim becomes shifting proﬁts toward the domestic ﬁrms. A large body
of literature has studied oligopolistic models with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms com-
peting in a third market. In this case, the optimal unilateral policy is an export
tax under price competition (or whenever SC holds; see Eaton and Grossman,
1986). Under quantity competition, an export subsidy can be optimal (Spencer
and Brander, 1983), but only under restrictive conditions. The ambiguity of
these results represents a major problem to derive policy implications.
When entry in the international market is free, however, the endogenous
entry approach suggests that any commitment able to turn the strategy of the
domestic ﬁrm into a more aggressive one is going to increase its proﬁts. More
precisely we can apply Prop. 2 and conclude that it is (unilaterally) optimal to
implement any form of strategic export promotion that increases the marginal
proﬁtability of the domestic ﬁrms: this may include direct or indirect state
aids for exporting ﬁrms, policies that boost demand or decrease transport costs,
export subsidies, R&D subsidies for exporting ﬁrms or related strengthening of
their IPRs. Here we will focus our attention on the optimal export subsidies
following Etro (2003).23 Adopting the usual notation, it is immediate to verify
that a (speciﬁc) export subsidy s increases the marginal proﬁtability of the
domestic ﬁrm, say ﬁrm H. For instance, under competition in quantities we
have:
Π(xH,β H,s)=[ p(xH,β H)+s]xH − c(xH) (31)
with:
Π13 = 1 (32)
while under competition in prices we have:
Π(xH,β H,s)=( pH + s − c)D(pH,β H)w i t h xH =1 /pH (33)
23For an application to state aids to R&D investment see Etro (2008,b).
33with:
Π13 = −D1p2
H > 0 (34)
Now, the optimal unilateral policy does not maximize the total proﬁts of the
domestic ﬁrm, but these proﬁts net of the subsidy (notice that prices aﬀect only
foreign consumers). Therefore, the optimal policy must simply maximize the
strategic impact on the domestic proﬁts: it follows that, as long as entry in the
international market is free, an export subsidy is always optimal.
We can say something more than this: the optimal policy must implement
nothing else than the Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous entry in which
the domestic ﬁrm is the leader, exactly the kind of equilibrium we have char-
acterized in Prop. 1. Why this equilibrium? Simply because it is the best
equilibrium that the domestic ﬁrm can aim for. It is now relatively simple to
derive the subsidies that implement this equilibrium. For instance, with ho-
mogenous goods, increasing marginal costs and competition in quantities, the
general expression for the optimal speciﬁc subsidy is (Etro, 2007):
s∗ = pH/  > 0
where pH is the equilibrium price of the domestic ﬁrm and   = −(pH/xH)
(dxH/dpH) the corresponding elasticity of demand. It is important to notice
that this optimal subsidy rate is exactly the opposite of the optimal export tax
rate in the neoclassical theory of trade policy.
We can also derive the optimal speciﬁc subsidy under price competition. In
our framework this is given by (Etro, 2007):
s∗ = −(pH − c)D2g0(pH)/D1 > 0
It is important to notice that the traditional optimal policy in the same model
with exogenous entry would have required, according to the result of Eaton and
Grossman (1986), a negative subsidy, that is an export tax.
At this point, the intuition for the general optimality of export promoting
policies should be straightforward. While ﬁrms are playing some kind of Nash
competition in the foreign market, a government can give a strategic advantage
to its domestic ﬁrm with an appropriate trade policy. When entry is free, an
incentive to be accommodating is always counterproductive, because it just
promotes entry by other foreign ﬁrms and shifts proﬁts away from the domestic
ﬁrm. It is instead optimal to provide an incentive to be aggressive, to expand
production or (equivalently) reduce the price, since this behavior limits entry
increasing the market share of the domestic ﬁrm. This is only possible by
subsidizing exports. Summing up:
Proposition 9. The optimal unilateral policies for domestic firms
exporting in a market with endogenous entry are state aids or
export subsidies which make these firms more aggressive.
34Of course, we need to remind the reader that we are here referring to the
optimal unilateral policy: as well known, if all countries were going to implement
their optimal unilateral policies, an ineﬃcient equilibrium would emerge. This
may explain why international coordination tends to limit export subsidies.
If we interpret globalization as the opening up of new markets to interna-
tional competition we can restate the main result as follows: in a globalized
word, there are strong strategic incentives to conquer market shares abroad by
promoting exports.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this article, I derived antitrust implications from the analysis of markets
where entry of ﬁrms is endogenous rather than exogenous, contrary to most of
the analysis within the post-Chicago approach. Many applications were about
the behavior of market leaders and, accordingly, issues of abuse of dominance.
Endogenous entry requires a wide revision of our understanding of the role of
incumbents in pricing, producing in the presence of network externalities and
multi-sided markets, bundling products, price discriminating and delegating to
retailers through vertical restraints: when entry is endogenous, leaders adopt ag-
gressive strategies without exclusionary purposes and without aﬀecting welfare
negatively. Endogenous entry has also implications for the analysis of mergers
(that take place only if they create enough cost eﬃciencies and do not harm
consumers), for the evaluation of collusive cartels (that are unfeasible in mar-
kets where entry is endogenous) and for unilateral state aids (that always are
optimal for ﬁrms exporting in markets where entry is free). The spirit of the
policy recommendation of the Chicago school was broadly supported by our
analysis in a solid game-theoretic framework.
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